Launch documentation for the 1937 introduction of the new Navy Gunto
Article about: For Navy and Gunto fans, here are the ordinances related to the launch of the new Navy Samurai style sword in 1937. The initial launch announcement seemed to have caused some confusion among
Launch documentation for the 1937 introduction of the new Navy Gunto
For Navy and Gunto fans, here are the ordinances related to the launch of the new Navy Samurai style sword in 1937.
The initial launch announcement seemed to have caused some confusion among officers about the nature of the new design. Many must have thought that it was only a matter of modifying their old swords to have an exterior looking like a Samurai sword.
Thus another ordinance had to follow a month later to clarify how each component needed to be made, explaining how a curved blade was now to be made in the traditional Samurai sword method and that Western style blades and iron may not be used.
I will not translate it, but will only provide the source material for those who may be interested in studying them.
Thanks for some more insight on the kai-gunto. I would have previously assumed that the blades that feature stainless steel used at least partly imported metal, but this suggests otherwise (at least early on).
The reason I thought this would be of interest to Gunto fans is that it is almost absurdly detailed in the nature of instructions it gives to Navy officers. Army spec sheets for manufacturing and quality checking are like this, but this is a higher level navy ordinance, normally not the level in which nuts and bolts manufacturing techniques are discussed.
It is almost as if the Navy feared that without this, their officers may end up buying fakes or something not even close to what the Navy was intending.
To give a simple example, even the ray skin finish of the Tsuka got as many as 4 separate articles that say the following
1. The grip surface must be finished with genuine ray skin, and nothing dubious such as Japanese shark skin.
2. The ray skin must be of a single sheet that covers the area from beneath the Kabutogane, ie from Tsukagashira to the upper edge of the Fuchi, and must be butt-joined at the rear (it is also permissible to join in the front with an overlap).
3. The Munakata and Hagata of the ray skin should not be shaved any more than required for the Tsukamaki.
4. The skin needs to be primed with more than one coating of Shimeurushi lacquer and receive more than two coatings of Shimeurushi tinted with pine soot or with Hakushitaurushi lacquer.
Obviously, all the above would have been mumbo jumbo to a normal Navy officer, yet the amount of detail made it read like instructions for a DIY sword kit for officers. It must have been something the officer was supposed to present to the Gunto seller, but the question is why they had to get into such detail to secure an outcome satisfactory to the Navy?
After the China Incident mobilization created a serious shortage of swords, many fakes or substandard swords were sold by unscrupulous dealers. Was this ordinance giving officers some hint as to what to look for to avoid getting ripped off?
Either way, under normal circumstances, such instructions only need to be supplied to those engaged in the manufacture of the swords and officers only needed to go to Suikohsha or wherever and just ask for the new navy sword. It is not normal that consumers have to read a manufacturing manual just to go buy a product. Some kind of circumstance existed at that time to question the reliability of such a normal transaction process.
Anyway I thought much of the significance of this document lied more between the lines than in the print.
My curiosity got the better of me, and I could not help going in search of the extraordinary circumstances which forced the Navy to lecture all its officers on proper sword-making skills.
Attached to an earlier draft of the instructions, I was able to find a memo explaining the reason for this highly irregular Navy Ordinance. Below is the translation of the memo giving the background.
“In order to manufacture durable and reliable Guntos, strict standards and rigorous testing like any other weapon would become indispensable.
However, because these Guntos are to be procured by the individual officers, there is fear that Koshirae and other aspects may end up simply being left to the merchant’s discretion.
This aspect is particularly worrisome in view of the lower skill level and lack of spirit of current artisans in comparison to those sword smiths of olden days, who were totally and enthusiastically devoted to their profession.
As proof of this decline in sword-making competence, we hear of not a few Army Guntos becoming totally useless on the battlefield.
To counter this deplorable tendency, it is felt necessary to draw attention to and stress the critical points in the manufacture of these swords by addressing, not only those engaged in the manufacture of the swords, but also enlightening all of our navy officers as well.”
So my guess was spot on. The Navy simply could not trust dealers and swordsmiths any more to deliver good work unless the officer, as consumer, became more sword savvy and demanding himself.
This aspect is particularly worrisome in view of the lower skill level and lack of spirit of current artisans in comparison to those sword smiths of olden days, who were totally and enthusiastically devoted to their profession.
As proof of this decline in sword-making competence, we hear of not a few Army Guntos becoming totally useless on the battlefield.
To counter this deplorable tendency, it is felt necessary to draw attention to and stress the critical points in the manufacture of these swords by addressing, not only those engaged in the manufacture of the swords, but also enlightening all of our navy officers as well.”
This also adds to the uncertainties we all face when someone brings a substandard gunto to the Forums for review. It is significant to learn that poor craftsmanship, even as far back as the China incident, was winding up in officer's hands and out to the field .... and potentially into OUR hands as we collect. Meaning SOME of the questionable gunto we see may very well be Japanese made, DURING the war, but are poor enough quality to make us doubt their origin.
Nick, you continue to contribute to our collecting world is ways that we cannot do for ourselves. I hope this website never goes down, or all this will be lost. I think all serious collectors should be archiving these posts into their own records for preservation of the information.
Reverse of the detailed points stressed in the announcement tell exactly what substandard practice was expected of unscrupulous sword makers. Even from the little I translated you can tell that bogus ray skin and scraps of ray skin were common problems.
As I have already gotten deep enough into the story of the new navy Gunto, I will go one step further and take you behind closed doors into a meeting that took place only a couple of weeks after the initial October 1937 introduction of the new navy sword.
About a month before the release of the Navy announcement on detailed quality standards required for the new sword, an orientation briefing was held at Suikousha on Friday, 5th November 1937 from 2 PM till 5 PM.
In attendance were 4 sword dealers, Suikousha staff and Navy officials. The main presentation explaining the features of the new sword design and the required level of quality for the Koshirae was given by Rear Admiral Chikaharu Koizumi, an authority on swords, who had earlier made the proposal to pattern the sword after a tachi from the Kamakura period.
Following this briefing, from 5 to 6 PM, the participants continued to discuss a coordinated timetable of preparations necessary for putting this new sword on the market.
The dealers in attendance were Nakano Shoten, Suya Shoten, Kobe Shoten and Matsuura Shoten, all sword handlers.
They agreed to jointly produce 2 sets of prototype metal fittings for the Koshirae and have them ready for approval by 10th December. The costs for prototype production was agreed to be borne by Suikousha.
After gaining this approval, they planned to prototype the whole exterior of the sword by latter half of February 1938, and assuming the final green light for the prototype by end of that month, they were each to submit production cost quotes for the final design. After assessing these quotes, a fixed price for the sword’s koshirae was to be set.
Thus to have Suikosha start accepting customer orders from mid March 1938 was the agreed plan that day.
Last edited by Nick Komiya; 08-11-2017 at 10:08 PM.
Let us contemplate for a moment what the facts above all mean and try to put it into some historical perspective.
My area of research is normally Army and therefore I cannot claim to be familiar with the Navy R&D processes, but how the Navy dealt with this sword launch certainly defies the normal rules and process of launching a new product.
Thorough prototype studies and field evaluations conducted before a design is made public should of course be the norm. But with this Navy officer's sword, the October 1937 announcement of the new sword design was not preceded by any practical R&D work, and even when the Navy briefed its officers on what to look for in a quality sword, they barely had two sets of metal fittings ready and not even a completed prototype sword to look at. Thus it was only 5 months after Navy officers got wind of a new sword design that they could actually place orders for it.
This highly unusual sequence of launching a new weapon can only be explained as the Navy’s desperate and improvised attempt to quickly make up for its liabilities in fighting land battles.
On this point, the launch documentation of October 1937 explained how their previous sword design was proving totally inadequate in the China Incident land battles that erupted since July 1937.
Such an urgent cry for a proper fighting sword within the Navy can only come from the Naval Land Forces such as those stationed in Shanghai China, who were there to protect Japanese citizens and institutions in the international city. The kind of guard duty traditionally provided by the US Marines at US embassies abroad was provided by the Naval Land Forces, so they would have been the first naval units to be caught with their pants down for not having a practical sword to fight with.
The Navy actually called this new sword a “Rikusen-to”, a land battle sword, and “Rikusen-tai” is what the NLF is called in Japanese. So you can say it was a sword primarily designed for use by the NLF. Yet the irony of post war collector myth had mistakenly given the title of “NLF sword” to, of all things, an Army sword which we now call the Rinji Seishiki sword.
Last edited by Nick Komiya; 08-13-2017 at 07:35 AM.
Launch documentation for the 1937 introduction of the new Navy Gunto
.
Bookmarks