How Dubious are “Theatre-made” or “Field-made” IJA Items?

[Nick Komiya]

How Dubious are “Theatre-made” or “Field-made” IJA Items?

In the field of WW2 German militaria, the designation, “Field-made” is euphemism for a crook’s immunity from the liability of authenticity guarantees. So many fakes that cannot make the grade as original issue material get swept under this big rug called field-made. But how about Japanese militaria? To what extent were there field or theatre-made items that deviated from true military specifications?



In the IJA, “Uniform” literally meant “Zero Tolerance for deviation”

As I have explained many times over already, regulations were so tightly enforced in the case of the Japanese military that personalization of issued items and field-made items were strictly forbidden at the soldier level.

Even when your leather waist belt stretched and became too loose, a soldier was strictly forbidden from even punching an extra hole in the leather, and instead one was required to take it to the unit’s gun smith, who had been given specific instructions on how the modification should be applied.

In comparison, officers bought their kit with an uniform allowance payout, so as is the case with most private purchase items, there usually was a range of choices to meet personal tastes. Thus collar heights, visor cap peak forms and sword fittings often depart from regulations for officer’s items. However, even then, when officers went conspicuously out of line, the army high command would crack down on them. As such, overall, there was a much higher degree of uniformity in Japanese military circles compared to what went on in Germany.


Theatre-Made Items 1 (1941 China)

However, the above does not mean that all army supplies were manufactured uniformly by the official supplier of the product in Japan.

As the whole purpose of Japan entering the war was to secure natural resources to sustain economic growth, when expansion of occupied territories availed Japan also of access to local production resources as well, the army strategically took advantage of such opportunities. That is to say that local or theatre production of army supplies was actively pursued.

So theatre-made items certainly existed, but the question here is, to what extent was that a reality?

The key to grasping the extent of the army’s intent to produce its supplies locally can be found in some army studies for securing self-sufficiency.

The first such study is dated 1941 March 12th, issued by the headquarters of the Northern China Area Army. It was titled “Resource Development and Acquisition and in-theatre self-supply based on Supply Depot Management Directives for Fiscal Year 1941”.

This extensive report of nearly 140 pages defines in minute detail what fuel, food supplies, medical supplies, animal feedstocks, construction work, transport, communication equipment, military clothing and weapons were to be locally produced in China and Manchuria.

Although I’ll only be picking out the clothing and weapons aspects of this report, the overall objective of this study is expressed as “In view of the nature of the ongoing incident and changing international outlook, to reinforce development and acquisition of critical national defense resources and prevention of enemy access thereof, in combination with enhancing self-sufficiency of the locale and conservation of resources in wartime”.

These initiatives were to be supervised at corps level to be carried out by field supply depots located throughout China.

To this end, these entities were required to survey availability, prices and supply volume of each resource in their respective territories and exchange this data with each other to identify the least expensive source. They were then expected to barter the goods in which they enjoyed a comparative advantage to minimize overall cost. At corps level, resources required for maintaining this local economy were to be withheld from what got shipped to mainland Japan.

Locally existing industries were to be prioritized for production and repair of military goods, but when insufficiencies remained, local private enterprises were to be supported or be invited from Japan.

However, ambitions for sophisticated production of chemicals or products requiring precision engineering were to be restrained, in view of the inadequate presence of industrialization in Northern China.


Self-supply of weapons related material

Priority was given to the following categories.

1. Spare parts and materials for local repairs that were easy to produce.

2. Replacements for locally used up materials, i.e. leather and hemp cloth products

3. Quickly consumed items like batteries that were advantageous for local production.

4. Items for which resupply from Japan was difficult, whereas local procurement was relatively easy and inexpensive.

Furthermore, each corps needed to track its past weapons consumption record and order any resupply from Japan at least 6 months in advance.


Local production priorities for clothing

Secondary clothing and repair material were priorities. Secondary clothing are such items as shirts, underwear and socks. Primary clothing like jackets, pants and caps, which were of a more durable nature, having A&B markings and anticipating reuse by multiple users were not considered for local production.



What this all meant in magnitude is demonstrated below in the form of a listing of weapons replacement parts suitable for local production in China. I’m showing the first two pages of that list, showing swords, bayonets, pistols and knee mortars.

For the Type 32 sword, they anticipated local supply of 6 parts, mainly screws, nuts and springs, along with the Seppa.

However, for the Type 95, they were only ready to rely on China for grip screws.

The range of parts remained similar for firearms, however, with the addition of fixing pins for assembly.

With the exception of Mantetsu swords, the army absolutely would not have trusted Chinese production of Type 98 or Type 95 swords, as these were highly sensitive products in which even “Made in Japan” versions had long suffered bashing, due to quality problems. Any China-made IJA sword can only be a pirated copy sold to IJA individuals by crafty Chinese merchants, nothing officially adopted by the IJA.

[Nick Komiya]

Theatre-made items 2 (1943 Tropics)

Next, let’s see how the army dealt with local supply in the tropics. There is a 18 page study dated 1943 September 20th prepared by the Southern Area Army on supply of food and clothing items.

By this time, things were going both literally and figuratively south for Japan and resupply from Japan became more precarious and unreliable.

Under these circumstances that forced troops in the Pacific to reduce dependency on resupply from Japan, the obvious top priority became feeding the troops within resources available locally.

Soy sauce had to rely on supply from Japan, but most everything else such as biscuits, rice, dried fish, vegetables, vitamin B for scurvy prevention, beer, fresh meat and tobacco were all locally secured within the army’s network that included, Indochina, Sumatra, Java, Malay, Borneo, Burma and Thailand.

They even made brandy and whiskey from coconuts and supplied beer to the navy. Though they still had to rely on supply from Japan for most chemicals and the fermentation microbes needed to start Sake and beer production, otherwise they were able to live pretty much off the land until the network of trade they built up broke down due to American intervention.

Apart from food, self-supply of clothing items got a lot of attention.

Here, one goal was to be 100% self-sufficient within 3 years in the supply of clothing for local volunteer troops (this would have included the PETA, established only a couple of weeks after this report was issued) and POWs.

Other items specifically identified to shift 100% to local production were lace-up ankle boots (excluding hobnails), jack boots, EM insignia (collar tabs, branch color breast patches), laundry soap, leather conditioning oil and dog tags.

What were expressly excluded from local production were helmets, boot spurs, water bottles, mess kits, overcoats, flight suits, majority of repair materials, woolen underwear, blankets, sewing threads, buttons, hobnails, dyes and other chemicals.

With these items as exceptions, roughly 70% of garment needs were to be locally made.

Footwear was especially high up on the list. 70% of the needs for ankle boots in the South Area Army was to be locally produced, while troops in Indochina and Thailand were to aim at 100% self-supply.

For these locally produced boots, the soles were to be of rubber as much as possible.

Jack boots production was to be centered in Java.

As for Tabi, the 39th Army was to be 100% local supplied, while the Burma Area Army, 7th Area Army and 16th Army were to localize 40% of their total needs.

Even fairly complicated gear like rubberized anti-gas suits for men and horses were produced in Singapore and Java.

As clear from the above, by September 1943, roughly 70% of tropical uniform resupplies were supposed to be locally produced. However, unlike the case in China, there was no discussion of local production of weapons parts this far south.

Under such circumstances, I have to concede that there was ample room for “Iffy items” like cotton army field caps to have existed as locally produced, theatre-made items.

Shown below are rubber-soled boots from my collection, which I now belatedly recognize as typical Thailand or Indochina production. Besides the rubber soles, the different style of markings, especially the black circle acceptance stamp indicates production outside Japan.

[Bruce Pennington]

As always, fabulous info Nick! Thanks for your work.

I believe the majority of "island-made" or "occupied lands made" swords, that are deemed legitimate, were made for PETA forces and other local military forces working in collaboration with the Japanese. I just re-read the page from a POW camp survivor that was making swords on order of the Japanese guards, but these were being sold to PETA.

Others that obviously look like they were intended for Japanese are mostly fakes. Yet, for forces that were literally abandoned, forced to live off the land, never to be re-supplied, I would not be surprised to find that enterprising people would make-do with local craftsmen rather than let their swords, uniforms, and equipment fall into total dis-repair without making any attempt to use resources available to keep them functional.

[Alan M]

This article is now included in Nick's Master Index that is sited in the "sticky" list . It will be found in the "Uniforms" section .

[Nick Komiya]

Theatre-made Items Continued

I was able to dig up more records from the archives on the subject, so let’s see how far recorded facts can take us.

As the war progressed, the topic of self-supply centered more and more on survival in the jungle, and carbohydrate sources such as tapioca root starch replaced rice. Ironically, tapioca, a Japan-wide fad among young girls in the last several years, is a totally alien substance to the immediate postwar generation like me, but for the wartime generation, it was probably food they never wanted to see again.

However, to collectors reading this, the hardware aspects are surely the focus of interest, so I will stay on tack on those areas here onwards.


China 1942-43

Picking up from where we left China in 1941, by June 1942, emphasis on locally produced uniform items gained enough momentum to send uniform-tailoring instructors from the army clothing depot. North and Central China Field Depots each got assigned 2 Ko-in (Gunzoku) instructors and 2 factory hands from the main clothing depot in Japan.


The following quotes are from April 1943 status reports exchanged among units in China.

Arashi Unit 6217 (116th Inft. Div.) said…
1. Leather consumption was 70% self-supplied by tanning hides from cows and pigs slaughtered for food. The alkaloids needed for this work were collected from local trees. Local resourcing was expected to reach 100% by end of 1943.

2. Recycling of felt field caps. Scrapped felt field caps were being washed, steam-formed and redyed into virtually brand new condition at a pace of 50 caps per day by a staff of 5 men.

3. Scrapped uniforms and boots were all taken apart and recycled as repair parts.

4. Wooden clogs (Geta) were being produced by the unit at an output level of 400 to 500 pairs since April 1942 to replace barracks wear for 50% of the unit.

5. Bamboo Kendo training swords (35 swords/day) and wooden dummy rifles (10/day) as well as 50 sets of protection gear for Jukenjyutsu training were made in-house.

6. Bricks, wooden bathtubs and cast-iron hardware for building needs were also unit-produced.

Sachi Unit 3700 (3rd Div.) said….
1. Each soldier was issued 9 candles per month made by the unit.

2. Matches, candle holders, buckets, ashtrays and paper were also made in-house

Kagami Unit 6801 (13th Div.) said…..
1. Using cotton thread in their former garrison area, socks were made to cover 1/3 of their consumption (each soldier was issued 3 pairs every 2 months)

2. Workshop for officer uniform items. 20 soldiers and 19 Chinese workers made uniforms, boots, shirts and underwear for officers. They were able to produce about 60 pairs of jack boots per month.

This is how each field depot shared information and traded with each other.

In this manner, used up felt field caps would go to the 116th Division and come back brand new, while officers knew that the 13th Division was where they could get their uniforms tailored.


As discussed elsewhere, felt field caps used to be issued only in rear areas within Japanese territory back in 1939, as wartime contingency specs, but relocation of troops from inland to China must have brought a good number of them to China by 1943. It is quite amazing to think that these labor-saving press-produced caps were renewable in ultimate Eco-fashion.

For officers that had to get their uniforms replaced in the field, necessary cloth and insignia were supplied to units like the 13th Division, having tailoring capability at their field depot.

Shown below is part of such a supply shipment manifest directed to the 21st Field Depot. After the bolts of cloth for officer uniforms, comes officer and Gunzoku field caps that include 3000 wool officer field caps, 300 cotton officer field caps, 700 each of wool and cotton Gunzoku field caps. We now know for sure that cotton field caps did exist for army officers, but was not a particularly favored choice.

[Nick Komiya]

1943 Manual on Theatre-Production of Uniforms

In 1943 July, the Main Army Uniform Depot issued a hefty 49-page guide on in-theatre uniform tailoring. It started with the number and size of cutting tables and how that translated into monthly uniform output and total floor space necessary for the workshop and went into models of Singer sewing machines required, etc.


Made in Manila

1943 Status reports are also available for army units in the Philippines.

Since the first offensive in Bataan in early 1942, movement of IJA troops in and out of that area intensified rapidly, which led to a spike in replacement needs for uniforms.

Despite this urgent need for tropical gear supply, there was no resupply from Japan at that time. So the army started uniform tailoring operations in Manila by taking advantage of existing factories there and using captured cloth.

They claim to have produced tens of thousands of field caps, life jackets, shirts, pants and ankle boots. All in all, they had 8 factories, locally producing these supplies. They also made their own leather supply and other products included socks, Tabi, gloves, mosquito nets, national flags, buttons, leather conditioning oil and soap.

Tens of thousands of “Made in Manila” IJA field caps out of captured cloth sounds very likely to be cotton caps, never produced in Japan. However, I continue to describe these items as “iffy”, not because their existence is in doubt, but because they are extremely difficult to tell apart from civilian caps.

Soldiers being repatriated to Japan invariably came back in uniform, devoid of all insignia, so any cotton cap that came back would be lacking the army star. These items would have nonetheless surely had some kind of markings applied at the field depots upon acceptance, but having seen no examples that are plausibly real, we have no clue what features to look for.

Thus, for the moment, these caps will have to stay in the grey zone and will remain risky purchases, if you ever come across them.

In Southeast Asia, where there was more local support such as in the form of PETA volunteers, there seem to have been more action involving the production of weaponry, like hand grenades and sometimes Gunto, but otherwise these self-supply reports shift almost entirely to food by 1944.

[RussM]

This is great info Nick, particularly about the felt caps, very interesting reading indeed!

[Adrian Stevenson]

Very interesting, many thanks.

[Razorback76]

Agreed, very interesting. I wonder if the recycling process discarded the mesh lining in these caps? Maybe the lining was just never replaced? I've seen quite a few in good condition but without lining. Also seen a lot with multiple names. Nick's article puts a new spin on these caps.

[adachi]

By any chance did you come across information for these shirts in the Philippines? They appear as early as December 1941 in photographs in the Philippines and ended up being worn all throughout the Pacific after units were transferred elsewhere. Here is an example of the Kawaguchi Detachment wearing them (along with one captured British shirt). I've always wondered if there was some documentation to prove whether they were reissued captured items or locally made like those mentioned in the 1943 reports.