SOS (Swords out of Stock) Alert
The August 1937 Toyama School Report on the Military Sword Supply Crisis
Back in 2015, when I first exposed the true identity of the so-called Type 3 Sword, as an expediently simplified wartime contingency alternative (Rinji Seishiki) to the Type 98, introduced to cope with the dire shortage of sword supply, I was met with a lot of pushback from the sword community, who insisted that no sword supply shortages existed back then.
In the last 5 years, people finally seem to have seen the light, but here is everything in black and white, a birds eye view of that critical shortage, finally expressed in numbers.
Back in August 1937, demand for officer-grade swords by the Army and Navy combined was 7600 new swords annually. In comparison, the maximum number of traditionally made blades that could be produced annually was only 2,100 pcs. That meant 72% of the annual demand had no chance of being supplied.
Against this, the Toyama School concluded that the only way left to boost production and balance supply and demand was to have the arsenals take production of the swords inhouse.
In a nutshell, the above was what the SOS report from the Toyama School said on 19th August 1937, but it is packed with invaluable data, so I’ll give you breakdowns of the above figures below.
First comes annual demand from the army and navy.
1. Field branches 1500 PCS
2. Finance Dept 150 PCS
3. Medical Dept 400 PCS
4. Veterinary Dept 50 PCS
5. Warrant Officers 1600 PCS
6. Officer Candidates 3500 PCS
7. Subtotal Army 7200 PCS
8. Navy 400 PCS
9. Total Demand 7600 PCS
Next the dismal supply situation
1. Nihon Tanrenkai (Japan Forging and Tempering Association) 900 PCS (75 PCS/Month)
2. Private Sector Smiths (10 PCS/Month x 10 Smiths) 1200 PCS
3. Total Supply 2100 PCS
They also commented on the limited prospects of being able to rely on old swords recycled from the public, saying that 2000 to 3000 swords would be tops for what they could dig up from civilians (as estimated by Navy Captain Kurata, who also was Chairman of Nihon Tanrenkai). So a call for public help was at best a stopgap measure for the short run and nothing sustainable for any length of time.
The report admits that supporting private smiths and protecting their livelihood would also be important, but shifting to inhouse production at arsenals was a must.
In this connection, it went on to say that the arsenal produced, Type 95 tested by their school had already proven itself to be unbending, unbreakable and sharp as a middle class quality Nihonto and quite suitable for use by the army. Admittedly it still lacked somewhat in grace of design as an officer’s sword, something to be improved in the future.
It ended by saying that calling upon reservists was key to ensure that new officers could properly be equipped. Not only swords, but that also applied to pistols and binoculars, which were equally in critical shortage during the recent China Incident.
Looking back, we should recall that the annual production volume targeted by the Rinji Seishiki aka Type 3 was 3000 swords a year, but that was only slightly better than the 2100 projected here in 1937. So the Army never saw that as any solution, but rather at this time in August 1937, the Toyama School was hoping they could come up with an officer’s version of the Type 95 and have them arsenal made.
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by Kiipu
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